11月8日下午14：30，我院高阳教授邀请上海科技大学赵登吉副教授作题为“Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games”的讲座。
摘要：We study cooperative games where players join sequentially, and the value generated by those who have joined at any point must be irrevocably divided among these players. We introduce two desiderata for the value division mechanism: that the players should have incentives to join as early as possible, and that the division should be considered fair. For the latter, we require that each player’s expected share in the mechanism should equal her Shapley value if the players’ arrival order is uniformly at random.
When the value generation function is submodular, allocating the marginal value to the player satisfies these properties. This is no longer true for more general functions. Our main technical contribution is a complete characterization of 0-1 value games for which desired mechanisms exist. We show that a natural mechanism, Rewarding First Critical Player (RFC), is complete, in that a 0-1 value function admits a mechanism with the properties above if and only if RFC satisfies them; we analytically characterize all such value functions. Moreover, we give an algorithm that decomposes, in an online fashion, any value function into 0-1 value functions, on each of which RFC can be run. In this way, we design an extension of RFC for general monotone games, and the properties are proved to be maintained.
报告人简介：赵登吉于2017年以tenure-track助理教授／博导／研究员加入上科大信息学院，并于2023年晋升为常任副教授。他是上科大信息学院机器人中心主任，CCF人工智能与模式识别专委与计算经济学专业组执委，CCF多智能体系统学组秘书长，CCF YOCSEF上海副主席，CCF/IEEE高级会员。他于2012年获澳大利亚西悉尼大学和法国图卢兹大学计算机双博士学位，于2009年获德国德雷斯顿工业大学和西班牙马德里理工双理学硕士学位，并于2006年取得了澳门科技大学计算机一等荣誉学士学位。加入上科大之前，他作为博士后先后师从亚洲首位美国人工智能协会会士(AAAI Fellow) Makoto Yokoo教授，和英国计算机领域首位皇家教授(Regius Professor)、现任拉夫堡大学校长Nick Jennings教授。
